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Smuggling was allegedly rife in Indonesia in the late sixties.

With its

30,000 miles of coastline, its proximity to the great entrepot centers of
Singapore and Hong Kong, and its extensive ties of family and finance between
Indonesian-Chinese and Chinese elsewhere in Southeast Asia, smuggling would
seem to be exceptionally easy there.

But smuggling is an illegal activity,

not lightly undertaken if it is not lucrative as well as easy.

Smuggling was

made attractive in Indonesia by the extraordinarily high tariffs (up to 300
percent) levied on many import1s, combined with lax and corruptible enforcement.
This combination, which can be found to a lesser degree in many developing coun
tries, meant that an inspection of Indonesia's economic policies, and especially its tariff and tax policies, offered little guide to what was actually
happening in Indonesia's economy.

High statutory tariffs do affect economic

behavior, but not necessarily in the intended direction.

Indonesia's high

tariffs neither protected Indonesia's industry nor produced tariff revenues
commensurate with their height.

Instead, they induced smuggling.

The notion of "smuggling" conjures up images of smugglers' lairs and small
boats operating stealthily in the night.

The dictionary defines smuggling as

"clandestinely importing dutiable goods without paying the customs."

Boats

*To appear in J. Bhagwati (ed.) Illegal Transactions in International Trade

-2however.
landing quietly in the night constitute only one form of smuggling,t For purposes of analyzing evasion of import duties in Indonesia, it is useful to dis
tinguish four types of smuggling, or methods of evasion of import duties.
First, imports may not be recorded by customs officials.

This can arise

either because they are landed outside of the official ports of entry, or be
cause they are moved covertly with or without the complicity of customs of
ficials through the official ports of entry.

The latter possibility is espec

ially important for types of goods that are large and require the specialized
equipment (e.g. cranes) that is available only in major ports. But surveillance
may be sufficiently lax that facilities may be used without leading to a record
of the imports, and without payment of duty.
Second, goods may come through the cus'toms post, but be falsely declared
as to value.

When tariffs are high, there is an incentive to under-invoice im

ports so as to reduce their dutiable value.

Extensive exchange controls on

payments to foreigners, e.g. on remittances of profits or repatriation of
capital by foreign-owned firms, creates an incentive in the opposite direction,
to over-invoice imports in order to export funds illegally. But Indonesia, un
usual among developing countries, has virtually no controls on the transfer of
funds across the foreign exchanges. so this incentive was absent except for
foreign investors who wanted to exaggerate their equity investment in the coun
try.

The tariff-induced incentives to under-invoLce, on the other hand, were

powerful.
Third, goods may come through the customs post but be falsely declared
with regard to their nature (e.g. automobiles declared as tractors) or to their
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quality (e.g. silk goods declared ·as cotton goods -- and possibly wrapped in
cotton goods), so as to lower the applicab le duty.

This type can be called

"miscla ssificat ion. 11
Fourth, goods may come through the customs post properly declared , but the
duties actually assessed are below those that are legally applica ble. We call
this "under-a ssessme nt."
Needles s to say, the probabi lity of success in using these various forms
of evasion depends on the degree of complic ity or the gullibi lity of the cus
toms service , with these attribut es becoming more importan t as one moves through
the list from the first to the fourth. But when duties are high, customs of
ficials are badly paid, and traditio ns of honesty do not pervade governm ent
official dom, this complic ity may

n1ot

be difficu lt to obtain.

In terms of their local market effects, there is perhaps not much dif
ference among these differen t types of smugglin g.
may be greatly differen t.

But their welfare effects

In a recent essay on the welfare 'implica tions of

smuggli ng, Bhagwat i and Hansen have argued that smugglin g in the presence of
legal imports may reduce economic welfare and under conditio ns of increasi ng
smugglin g costs is bound to reduce economic welfare . 1

This result depends

critica lly on the assumpti on that there are social costs associat ed with smug
gling, as indeed might be gen.eral ly expected to be the case when smugglin g is
of the "motorb oat in the night" variety .

1 Jagdish

(Even here, however , there may be

Bhagwat i and Bent Hansen, "A Theoret ical Analysi s of Smuggli ng,"
Quarter ly Journal of Economi cs, LXXXVII (May 1973) pp. 172-187 , reprinte d as
Chapter 2 in this volume.

-4greater social cost in routing some goods through official ports of entry in
a country like Indonesia than simply landing them near the point of local
sale; so the assu~ption even

that type I smuggling is socially more costly

than legal trade may be questioned.)
three types of smuggling.
or literally zero.

But it is clearly not true of the last

There the additional social costs may be negligible

Of course, where the complicity of customs officials is

involved, importers may have to bribe them into non-enforcement. But these
bribes are transfer payments, not

social coats that absorb resources.

1

Under these circumstances, smuggling of the last three types -- and possi
bly smuggling of the first type as well -- will lead neither to gain nor to
loss of welfare in the Bhagwati-Hansen framework.

And of course to the extent

that smuggling of all types actually eliminates full duty-paid imports, there
will be a welfare gain, for tariff-induced price distortions will have been
reduced.
However, the neo-classical framework they use for their analysis of the

in most developing countries, viz, the need to rely on tariffs as a relatively
low-cost source of government revenue.

Indonesia in the late sixties drew one

third of its total (non-aid) revenues from import and export duties. To the

1

rt should also be added that the Bhagwati-Hansen framework is one of
full employmen~ of local resources, a framework that is not fully relevant in
many less develov~u couutties. Even increasing-cost smuggling may yield a
social benefit when it involves the employment of otherwise unemployed resources,
provided the smugglers' spending generates seconnary employment.

-5extent that governments need to raise revenues to finance public goods, a wel
fare loss is incurred by any development that either reduces those revenues or
forces the government to increase its expenditures on collection.

A welfare

analysis of smuggling is surely incomplete without taking this important
factor into account.
What can one say about the relative importance of the different types of
smuggling noted above?

Unfortunately, not much.

It is in the n~ture of illegal

transactions that they do not get accurately recorded, so any evidence on their
magnitude is necessarily circumstantial and inferential, based on incomplete
and indirect sources of information.
The first type of smuggling is not recorded at all, for instance. But the
goods must be paid for.

This means that they must appear somewhere in a com

plete set of the importing country's balance of payments accounts, if only in
the errors and omissions. Thus the balance-of-payments accounts might seem to
put at least circumstantial limits on the amount of smuggling.

In the late six

ties, however, Indonesia's balance of payments showed a positive balancing
item, rather than a negative one which unrecorded payment for smuggled imports
would require. Several explanations are possible, such as that the value of
smuggled exports (to evade a modest tax on exported rubber) exceeded that of
smuggled imports.

The aost probable explanation, however, is that Indonesian

owned assets, which had left the country during the political turmoil of the
early and mid-sixties, were returning both in the form of unrecorded capital
inflows and in the form of unrecorded imports.

Inferences from balance-of

payments figures can be no better than those figures, and for many developing
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countries most of the accounts, especially for capital and service trans
actions, represent at best crude approximations of what is really happening.
An alternative approach to estimate the magnitude of smuggling is to rely
on the trade figures of partner countries.

This technique, while perhaps

better than none, places great burdens on the accuracy of those figures, and
is exceptionally difficult in the case of Indonesia because of the lack of
uniform treatment in trade statistics of entrepot centers such as Singapore,
through which a substantial portion of Indonesia's trade flows.
The second type of smuggling, under-invoicing, can also be expected to be
reflected in the errors and omissions of the balance-of-payments accounts.
In addition, however, a more direct check can be made through comparison of
unit values of imports (c.i.f. import value divided by some measure of quan
tity or even weight) with known foreign prices.

Many imports are sufficiently

idiosyncratic (e.g. a made-to-order piece of machinery) that foreign prices
different from those shown on the invoice are difficult or impossible to obtain.
But other prices are quite standard, and still others are subject to ranges of
common-sense plausibility.

Comparisons of this type suggest

that under-in

voicing into Indonesia was quite common in the late sixties, although it is
impossible to say just how great was its magnitude.
drawn from the imports recorded by customs:

To give only a few examples,

gold imports, dutiable at 8 percent,

carried an import unit value of under $23 an ounce; motorcycles, dutiable at
50-100 percent, had a unit value of $129; motorcycle tires, a unit value of
$2.27; table salt, dutiable at 140 percent, a unit value of 1.5/ a kilogram;
and so on.
ty data.
spread.

Some of these may be the result of careless recording of the quanti
But there were enough examples to suggest under-invoicing was wide

This practice lowers the effective rate of duty.

-7The third type of smuggling cannot be detected at all through indirect
processes: the correct value is declared and the correct duty is paid for the
merchandise declared.

Direct inspection is required to see whether the goods

have been misclassified.
Sometimes the several types of smuggling are used together. For example,
automobiles were being imported into Indonesia at suspiciously low unit values.
They were however declared as used automobiles at those values.

Later a smug

gling ring involving several customs officials was discovered t.o be engaged in
this misdeclaration, and a number of persons were jailed for the offense.
The fourth type of smuggling, under-assessment of legal duty, can be dis
covered by comparing revenues collected, declared values, and statutory duties,
commodity by commodity.

This comparison requires that the import statistics

be kept on the same basis as the tariff schedule; otherwise discrepancies in
classification will mar the comparison.

The data displayed in Chart I are not

entirely free from this last difficulty, but they probably offer a reasonable
approximation to the discrepancy between statutory duties and duties actually
collected.

Association of these discrepancies with illicit activity is further

complicated by the fact that certain classes of importers (some government
agencies, foreign or domestic investors in "pioneer" industries, etc.) are
entitled to exemption from duties on imports essential for their activities.
As a rule, however, imports of capital goods and raw and intermediate materials
carry only low duties, so this complicating factor is not sufficient to explain
the marked shortfall of collections in the range of commodities subject to
high duties.

It is noteworthy that the proportionate extent of shortfall

-8tends to increase with the statutory duty, a point that will be discussed fur
l
ther below.
While we cannot be sure of the total amount of smuggling or of the relative importance of the different types, except that in Indonesia all were pre
sent to some degree, we can measure more directly the effects of all types of
smuggling on the marketplace. To this end, local wholesale prices for about 70
commodities were collected and compared with estimates of the c.i.f. prices aug
mented by the tariff and other taxes on imported goods.
in Chart II, which has a basic format similar to Chart I.

The results are shown
Statutory duties are

measured along the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows the local whole
sale price as a percentage of the_c.i.f. price. The 45-degree line indicates what
the c.i.f. price inclusive of duty and tax would be, before allowance for impor
ter and wholesale mark-ups.

Thus if all imports were fully duty-paid, all the

points (each of which represents a single, well-specified good, e.g. a room fan
of a certain brand and model) would lie above, presumably well above, the 45-degree
line. As can be seen_, most of the points in fact lie below the line, and virtually
all the points lie below the dashed line, which would be the price with a uni.form 25 percent mark-up on tariff-inclusive prices. Moreover, the extent to which
they lie below the 45-degree line seems to depend on the level of the tariff, i.e.,
the higher the tariff plus other applicable taxes, the gr~ater the proportionate
shortfall -- the same phenomenon that we observed in connection with under
assessment of duties. A linear regression of the observed wholesale price as a
percentage of the hypothetical full duty-paid price on the level of the tariff
plus taxes suggests that the shortfall increases by 22 percent of higher
1

The points that have not been connected to the rest are de minimus (under
$500,000) in recorded import value; the two goods carrying duties of 280 and
300 percent--drinking glasses and matches--were believed to have been subject
to extensive under-invoicing.
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Reiationship between Scheduled Duties
an-a· Actual Tariff collections.
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Ratio of·nomestic to Foreign Price of Imports
in relation to Duties plus
Taxes.
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At taxes plus duty of 100 percent, the market

price is just equal (on average) to the full duty-paid price (implying a do
mestic mark-up on average of 22 percent); at taxes plus duty of 200 percent,
the market price falls to only 78 percent of the full duty-paid price.

To

put the point another way, as the tariff plus taxes are raised from zero to
100 percent, only 78 percent (on average) are actually reflected in the market
price; and as the tariff plus truces are raised further to 200 percent, only
34 percent of this increment is actually reflected in the market price.

In

creases in tariffs above 230 percent will result (on average) in an actual
1
Revenue collections will of course fare even
reduction of market price.
worse, for the market price reflects not only tax collections but also other
costs (including bribes) that may be associated with importing the goods in
question.

Variation around these averages is of course wide, as the scatter

in Chart II indicates.

But the underlying tendency of market prices to rise

with duties, but less than proportiona tely, is unmistakabl e.
What explains this pattern of behavior?

One plausible model involves a

threshold of illegality which importers are reluctant to cross, but once it
is crossed illicit activity dominates the market.

Thus if the costs of smug

gling were the same (per unit value) for all goods, all imports dutiable below
a threshold tariff would enter the country legally, with full duty being paid,
while all goods dutiable above that threshold would pay no duties.

In terms

1
The linear regression result was P/f • 1.22 - .22t, where pis the ob
served market price, f • c(l + t) is the hypothetica l full duty-paid price,
tis the rate of duty plus indirect taxes, and c is the c.i.f. price. Multi
plying through by f and substituti¥ g yields a market price quadratic in the
tariff rate: p • [1.22 + t - .22t Jc. p/c reaches a maximum at t • 229 percent.
All the empirical work reported here was done with the collaboratio n of
Lawrence White of Princeton University, to whom I am grateful for assistance.
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line (before allowance for domestic mark-ups), while all the points beyond the
threshold tariff would lie along a horizontal line somewhat below the market
price ratio of the goods dutiable just at the threshold (reflecting the con
jecture that importers are willing to incur some cost to remain law-abiding ).
Reality is not so clear cut.

Undoubtedly there is a threshold of law

ahidingness below which smuggling will he negligible.

Penalties for breaking

the law are not proportiona l to the benefits; indeed they arise even if benefits
are nil.

Breaking the law also exposes one to blackmail, damages reputation

and hence business good-will, and so on.

So importers are likely to be willing

to pay a full duty so long as it is "small", even when it exceeds the direct
costs of smuggling.

How small is "small" will vary from culture to culture, for

the traditions of law-ahiding ness, and the social penalties associated with
being, caught breaking the law, vary substantial ly from country to country.
Once tariffs and taxes rise above this threshold level, smuggling is not
in fact likely to replace legal trade altogether.

This is in part because the

costs of smuggling will vary from commodity to commodity (whereas the threshold
tariff is not likely to vary so much, if at all), so the gains from smuggling
at the threshold will vary substantial ly from commodity to commodity.

Further

more, some importers are likely to want to remain as close to the law as
possible and still remain in business, whereas others will leave it more quick
ly.

Risk aversion will differ from businessman to businessman , and there is

no insurance market to hedge against getting caught in violation of the law.
Thus some importers, instead of abandoning legal entry altogether, will begin

-13to "trim" through modest under-invoicing or through small bribes to achieve
under-assessmen t or misclassificati on to qualify for a lower duty. But they
continue to import through a customs post and they continue to pay some duty.
As the tariffs rise relative to the cost of the first type of smuggling, the
amount of "trimming" will also increase, and probably more than proportionate
ly, for two reasons.

First, the incentives to trim rise with the duty.

Second,

it becomes increasingly difficult for any one importer to stay in business as
the extent of tariff evasion grows.

With competition from smuggling of any

type, what appears to be an indirect tax, the tariff, becomes a direct tax
on the income of he who pays it, for he cannot pass it on to his customers.
As

the pervasiveness of evasion increases, this fact becomes increasingly

apparent, even to the customs officials, and their willingness to provide
some relief to the relatively law-abiding importer, enough at least to keep him
in business, will result in systematic under-assessmen t or other forms of per
mitted evasion.

The result of this process is something like the observed

pattern: import costs that rise with the statutory tariff, but less than pro
portionately.
Various possible cases can be expressed in algebraic terms.

Let si be the

constant cost of smuggling commodity i, as a proportion of its c.i.f. price,
Let r

i

• pi/ci be the ratio of the local market price to the c.i.f. price.

Then if we make no allowance for local mark-ups or for law-abidingness , ri • 1 + t
if si > ti and ri = 1 + si if si

<

ti, where ti is the ad valorem tariff and

other applicable taxes on commodity i.

-14A general schedule relating r tot then depends on the relationship be
tweens and t.

Ifs and tare uncorrelated over all commodities, then the

general relationship between rand twill be r • 1 + t up to some threshold
of law-abidingness, t

*

(where t

for still higher values oft·,

*

median
may exceed the
/ value of s), and r • 1 +

s

wheres is the median value of s.

If, to take another extreme case, sand tare perfectly correlated, as
might be the case if the tariff was aimed at protection rather than revenue
and took "smugglability" into account, then r • 1 + t up to the threshold of
law-abidingness, and r ;.. 1 + kt for still higher values of t, where k < 1 is the
constant of proportionality between si and ti.
These alternative formulations would show the following general patterns,
where t * indicates the threshold of law-abidingness:

r

s,t uncorrelated

s,t perfectly correlated
/

r

1.0

t*

t

t

*

t

A combination of the two patterns would hold if importers drew a sharp
say,
distinctioiybetween type I smuggling and under-invoicing (as they might do, forinstance, if the penalties for the former were much stiffer than for the latter).

-15Then importers would continue to pay a fraction of the legal tariff,
a fraction that might be expected to decline with higher and higher tariffs
because of the alternative possibility of Type I smuggling.
)

r

/

/ /.

~

~

1.0

t*

t

Thus we have a mixed system, in which smuggling of several types takes
place simultaneously, in which many importers pay some but less than full duty,
and in which the government collects as revenue not only less than regulations
call for but also less than importers pay.

Moreover, the protection provided

by tariffs to local industries is less, sometimes substantially less, than the
nominal tariff schedule would suggest.

The welfare consequences of such a

mixed system cannot be determined~ priori. The efficiency gains from lower
protection must be set against the real resource costs (if any) of smuggling
plus the incremental cost of raising government revenue elsewhere or foregoing
government expenditure.
It would in these cases improve national welfare if tariffs could be
lowered to levels at which they seem "reasonable" to the law-abiding business
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community and are not too costly to enforce against remaining smugglers.

If

this is done, government revenues will rise by inducing a higher proportion
of imports through legal channels.

The protective effect of duties may also

rise, to the extent that a threshold of law-abidingness exists and exceeds
the cost of smuggling.

Thus it may not serve the interests even of pro

tectionist policy-makers to set tariffs as high as possible.

